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PREDICTING THE ELLIPTIC CURVE CONGRUENTIAL
GENERATOR
LA´SZLO´ ME´RAI
Abstract. Let p be a prime and let E be an elliptic curve defined over
the finite field Fp of p elements. For a point G ∈ E(Fp) the elliptic
curve congruential generator (with respect to the first coordinate) is a
sequence (xn) defined by the relation xn = x(Wn) = x(Wn−1 ⊕ G) =
x(nG ⊕ W0), n = 1, 2, . . . , where ⊕ denotes the group operation in
E and W0 is an initial point. In this paper, we show that if some
consecutive elements of the sequence (xn) are given as integers, then one
can compute in polynomial time an elliptic curve congruential generator
(where the curve possibly defined over the rationals or over a residue
ring) such that the generated sequence is identical to (xn) in the revealed
segment. It turns out that in practice, all the secret parameters, and
thus the whole sequence (xn), can be computed from eight consecutive
elements, even if the prime and the elliptic curve are private.
1. Introduction
For a prime p, denote by Fp the field of p elements and always assume that
it is represented by the first p-many non-negative integers {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fp given by an affine Weierstrass
equation, which for gcd(p, 6) = 1 takes the form
(1) y2 = x3 +Ax+B,
for some A,B ∈ Fp with non-zero discriminant 4A3 + 27B2 6= 0.
The Fp-rational points E(Fp) of E form an Abelian group (with respect
to the usual addition denoted by ⊕) with the point at infinity O as the
neutral element. Let x(·) and y(·) be the coordinate functions, then for a
point P ∈ E(Fp), P 6= O with affine components P = (xP , yP ) we have
x(P ) = xP and y(P ) = yP .
For a given point G ∈ E(Fp) and initial point W0 ∈ E(Fp) the ellip-
tic curve congruential generator is the sequence (Wn) of points of E(Fp)
satisfying the recurrence relation
Wn = G⊕Wn−1 = nG⊕W0, n = 1, 2, . . .
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We also define the elliptic curve congruential generator with respect to the
first coordinate as the sequence (xn) in Fp as
(2) xn = x(Wn) = x(nG⊕W0), n = 1, 2, . . .
The elliptic curve congruential generator has been widely studied, many
positive results have been proven about its randomness, see [1–6,8,9,11–14,
16] and see also the survey paper [15]. In particular, El Mahassni and Sh-
parlinski [5] showed that (Wn), and so the sequence (xn), is well-distributed.
Hess and Shparlinski [8], and Topuzog˘lu and Winterhof [16] provided lower
bounds to the linear complexity profile of the sequence (xn).
However, it is clear, that when the curve E is given, the sequence (Wn)
is predictable from two consecutive points Wn, Wn+1. In [7], Gutierrez and
Ibeas showed that when the prime p and G are known, then the sequence
(Wn) is predictable even if just an approximation of Wn, Wn+1 are revealed
(even if the curve E is private). These show that the security of the point
sequence (Wn) is not well-established. However these attacks use the as-
sumption that the prime and the curve (resp. the point G) are given which
assumption is quite optimistic (in the viewpoint of the attacker).
In our cryptographic settings, all the parameters, as the initial point
W0 = (x0, y0), the generator G = (xG, yG), the parameters of the curve
A,B and the prime p are assumed to be secret and just the output of the
generator x1, x2, . . . represented as non-negative integers, are used. The
main contribution of this paper is that if some consecutive elements are
revealed, then one can compute in polynomial time (polynomial in log p)
an elliptic curve congruential generator (where the curve possibly defined
over the rational or over a residue ring) such that the generated sequence is
identical to (xn) in the revealed segment. It turns out that in practice, all
the secret parameters, and thus the whole sequence (xn), can be computed
from eight consecutive elements.
The result suggests that for cryptographic applications the elliptic curve
congruential generator should be used with great care.
In Section 2 we summarize some basic facts about elliptic curves. In
Section 3 we present the algorithm, and in Section 4 we discuss results of
numerical tests.
2. Background
In this section we summarize some basic facts about elliptic curves. First
we recall the definition of the group operation ⊕ of E defined over arbitrary
field k. Then we extend the notion of elliptic curve to the case where it is
defined over a ring.
2.1. The group law on the curve. Let k be a field of characteristic dif-
ferent from 2, 3. Let E be an elliptic curve defined over k given by an
affine Weierstrass equation (1) with A,B ∈ k, 4A3 + 27B2 6= 0. The group
operation ⊕ in E is defined in the following way.
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Definition 1. The operation ⊕ is defined over E as follows. If P = (xP , yP )
and Q = (xQ, yQ) are in E(k), then
P ⊕Q = R = (xR, yR),
where
(i) if xP 6= xQ, then
xR = s
2 − xP − xQ, yR = s(xP − xR)− yP , where s =
yQ − yP
xQ − xP
;
(ii) if xP = xQ but yP 6= yQ, then P ⊕Q = O;
(iii) if P = Q and yP 6= 0, then
xR = s
2 − 2xP , yR = s(xP − xR)− yP , where s =
3x2P +A
2yP
;
(iv) if P = Q and yP = 0, then P ⊕Q = O.
2.2. Elliptic curves over Zm. Ifm is a composite integer with gcd(m, 6) =
1, elliptic curve E can be also defined over Zm via the projective Weierstrass
equation
y2z = x3 +Axz2 +Bz3
with A,B ∈ Zm, gcd(4A3 + 27B2,m) = 1. The Zm-rational points E(Zm)
of E with projective coordinates can be represented as a triple (x : y : z)
such that gcd(m,x, y, z) = 1 (but not necessarily z = 0 or 1).
As in the field case, group operation can be defined on E (see [10, 17])
whose formulas correspond to Definition 1 if the divisor in (i) or (ii) is co-
prime to m.
We remark that for integers m1,m2, gcd(m1,m2) = 1 we have
E(Zm1m2) ∼= E(Zm1)⊗E(Zm2)
as groups. Moreover, if E is an elliptic curve over Q defined by (1) with
integers A,B, then for m with gcd(4A3 + 27B2,m) = 1, the map E(Q) →
E(Zm) defined by
(x : y : z) 7→ (x mod m : y mod m : z mod m)
is a group homomorphism (where the representation (x : y : z) is chosen as
x, y, z ∈ Z and gcd(x, y, z) = 1).
Finally, for arbitrary integers m1,m2 (not necessarily co-primes), the the
map E(Zm1m2)→ E(Zm1) defined by
(x : y : z) 7→ (x mod m2 : y mod m2 : z mod m2)
is a group homomorphism.
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3. Predicting the congruential generator on elliptic curve
over rings
Suppose we are given an initial segment x1, . . . , xs of a sequence (xn)
generated by an elliptic curve generator as non-negative integers. We would
like to predict the remainder part of this sequence and specially, to compute
the parameters of the generator, namely, the prime p, the parameters of the
curve A, B and the points G, W0.
If for two different generators with primes p and q, the revealed initial
segments coincide, then the same initial segment is generated by an elliptic
curve generator over Zp·q. Clearly, in this case only the generator over
the ring Zp·q is computable (without assuming the easiness of the integer
factorization problem) and to recover the private parameters further revealed
elements are needed.
On the other hand, if the curve E is defined over Q with non-negative
integers A,B and G,W0 ∈ E(Q) are points such that x(iG ⊕W0) are all
integers for i = 1, . . . , s, then there are infinitely many possible primes p
(and generators) exist, namely all large enough primes are suitable.
Thus our aim is to determine the most general elliptic curve generator
(possibly over Q or over a ring Zm) which generates the same initial segment.
The following theorem shows that if at least seven initial values are re-
vealed, then it can be computed a curve E over Q or over Zm with p | m
and points G, W0 such that these revealed values are the initial segment of
a sequence generated by an elliptic curve generator with E, G and W0. If
more values are revealed, then a better approximation can be given to the
generator (i.e. to the prime p).
Theorem 1. There is an algorithm such that for given pairwise distinct
non-negative integers x1, . . . , x7 generated by the elliptic curve congruential
generator (2) with prime number p > 3, non-singular elliptic curve E =
EA,B (A,B ∈ Fp), and points W0, G ∈ E(Fp) with Wn 6= ±G for n =
1, . . . , 6, the algorithm computes a curve E
A˜,B˜
over Q or over Zm with p | m
and a pair (x˜G, (˜y2G)) in polynomial time (polynomial in log p) such that if
(3) x˜n = 2
x˜3n−1 + A˜x˜n−1 + B˜ +
(˜
y2G
)
(x˜n−1 − x˜G)2
−2(x˜n−1+x˜G)−x˜n−2, n = 2, 3, . . . ,
then x˜n ≡ xn mod p whenever Wn 6= O.
We summarize the steps of computing in Algorithm 1.
Remark 1. The assumption that we are given the initial segment of the
sequence (xn) is just a technical simplification. If any segment xk, . . . , xk+6
of length seven are given, substitutingW0 byWk−1 we get a generator whose
initial values are xk, . . . , xk+6.
Remark 2. If we increase the number of revealed elements, then the algo-
rithm can be extended which provides a better approximation m to p and
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Algorithm 1 Predicting the EC-LCG
Input: non-negative integers x1, . . . , x7 generated by an elliptic curve con-
gruential generator (2)
Output:
(
x˜, (˜y2), A˜, B˜,m
)
such that p | m, and if x˜n (n = 2, 3, . . . ) gener-
ated by (3), then x˜n ≡ xn mod p whenever Wn 6= O.
1: define the vectors c1, c2, c3, c4 as the columns of the matrix C in (6) and
u as (7)
2: m← det(c1, c2, c3, c4,u).
3: if m = 0 then
4: write λ1c1 + λ2c2 + λ3c3 + λ4c4 = µu with λ1, . . . , λ4, µ ∈ Z, µ > 0
5: m← (λ21 − λ2µ)/ gcd(λ
2
1, µ)
6: if m = 0 then
7: x˜← λ1
µ
, (˜y2)←
(
λ1
µ
)3
+ λ4
2µ
+ λ1λ3
2µ2
,A˜← λ3
µ
, B˜ ← λ4
2µ
− λ1λ3
2µ2
8: end if
9: end if
10: if m 6= 0 then
11: while c1, c2, c3, c4 are linearly dependent modulo m do
12: write λ1c1+λ2c2+λ3c3+λ4c4 ≡ 0 mod m with (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) 6=
(0, 0, 0, 0),
13: m← gcd(m,λ1, λ2, λ4, λ5)
14: end while
15: write λ1c1 + λ2c2 + λ3c3 + λ4c4 ≡ µu mod m with µ > 0
16: if gcd(m,µ) > 0 then
17: m← m/ gcd(m,µ)
18: end if
19: write λ1c1 + λ2c2 + λ3c3 + λ4c4 ≡ u mod m
20: if λ21 6≡ λ2 mod m then
21: m← gcd(m,λ21 − λ2)
22: end if
23: x˜← λ1 mod m, (˜y2)← λ
3
1 +
λ4+λ1λ3
2
mod m, A˜← λ3 mod m,
24: B˜ ← λ4−λ1λ3
2
mod m
25: end if
26: return
(
x˜, (˜y2), A˜, B˜,m
)
hence a better approximation to (xn), see Section 4. In practice, 8 elements
contain enough information to learn the exact value of p.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us assume, that the integers x1, . . . , x7 generated
by an elliptic curve congruential generator (2) are given.
By (2), we can write
xi−1 = x(Wi ⊕ (−G)), xi = x(Wi), xi+1 = x(Wi ⊕G), i = 2, . . . , 6,
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where −G is the (additive) inverse of G: −G = (xG,−yG). By the addition
law, by the assumption that Wi 6= ±G (i = 1, . . . , 6) and by (1) we have
xi−1 + xi+1 =
(
yi + y
xi − xG
)2
− xi − xG +
(
yi − y
xi − x
)2
− xi − xG(4)
= 2
y2i + y
2
(xi − xG)2
− 2(xi + xG)
= 2
x3i +Axi +B + y
2
G
(xi − xG)2
− 2(xi + xG), i = 2, . . . , 6
in Fp. Thus
(xi−xG)
2(xi−1+xi+1) ≡ 2(x
3
i+Axi+B+y
2
G)−2(xi+xG)(xi−xG)
2 mod p,
i = 2, . . . , 6
i.e.,
(5)
(2x2i+2xi(xi−1+xi+1))xG+(2xi−(xi−1+xi+1))x
2
G+2xiA+2B+2y
2
G−2x
3
G
≡ (xi−1 + xi+1)x
2
i mod p, i = 2, . . . , 6.
Put
(6)
C =


2x22 + 2x2(x1 + x3) 2x2 − (x1 + x3) 2x2 2 2 −2
2x23 + 2x3(x2 + x4) 2x3 − (x2 + x4) 2x3 2 2 −2
2x24 + 2x4(x3 + x5) 2x4 − (x3 + x5) 2x4 2 2 −2
2x25 + 2x5(x4 + x6) 2x5 − (x4 + x6) 2x5 2 2 −2
2x26 + 2x6(x5 + x7) 2x6 − (x5 + x7) 2x6 2 2 −2


∈ Q5×6
and
(7) u =


(x1 + x3)x
2
2
(x2 + x4)x
2
3
(x3 + x5)x
2
4
(x4 + x6)x
2
5
(x5 + x7)x
2
6


∈ Q5.
Write C = (c1, . . . , c6) with c1, . . . , c6 ∈ Z5. Then we have
Lemma 1. Having the same assumption as in Theorem 1, the columns c1,
c2, c3, c4 are linearly independent over Fp.
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Assuming Lemma 1, the matrix C has rank 4 over Fp, and by (5) the
congruence
(8) C · e ≡ u mod p
has the solution e = (xG, x
2
G, A,B, y
2
G, x
3
G)
T .
The algorithm looks for an integer m such that the congruence (8) has a
solution e = (e1, . . . , e6)
T modulo m with the additional restriction e21 ≡ e2
mod m. During the algorithm we will always have p | m. If m takes a finite
value, then we can suppose that gcd(m, 6) = 1, since p > 3. Moreover, a ≡ b
mod m for m = 0, means that a = b as rationals.
Since the congruence (8) has solutions, det(c1, c2, c3, c4,u) ≡ 0 mod p.
First, assume that det(c1, c2, c3, c4,u) 6= 0 and putm = det(c1, c2, c3, c4,u).
If c1, c2, c3, c4 are linearly dependent modulo m, say, λ1c1+ λ2c2+ λ3c3+
λ4c4 ≡ 0 mod m with (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) 6= (0, 0, 0, 0), then we have p | gcd(λ1,
λ2, λ3, λ4). Replacing m to gcd(m,λ1, λ2, λ4, λ5) we reduced m with main-
taining the property p | m. Iterating this step, we can assume that c1, c2,
c3, c4 are linearly independent modulo m.
By the vanishing of the determinant, c1, c2, c3, c4, u are linearly de-
pendent modulo m: λ1c1 + λ2c2 + λ3c3 + λ4c4 ≡ µu mod m. By the
independence of c1, c2, c3, c4, µ 6≡ 0 mod m and if µ is minimal and posi-
tive, the coefficients λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, µ are unique. If gcd(m,µ) > 1, replacing
m to m/ gcd(m,µ) we can assume µ = 1, i.e. λ1c1+λ2c2+λ3c3+λ4c4 ≡ u
mod m with unique λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4. Finally, all solutions of the congruence
(9) C · e ≡ u mod m
can be expressed as
(10) e1 = λ1, e2 = λ2, e3 = λ3, e4 + e5 − e6 = λ4.
If λ21 6≡ λ2 mod m, we have to replace m to gcd(m,λ
2
1 − λ2).
Next, consider the case when det(c1, c2, c3, c4,u) = 0 (over Q). Now, the
equation
C · e = u
has solutions over Q. By Lemma 1, c1, c2, c3, c4 are linearly independent
over Fp and thus over Q. As before
(11) λ1c1 + λ2c2 + λ3c3 + λ4c4 = µu, gcd(λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, µ) = 1, µ > 0
with unique integers λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, µ. Moreover, every integer solution (λ
′
1,
λ′2, λ
′
3, λ
′
4, µ
′) of (11) has the form γ·(λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, µ) with some γ ∈ Z. Since
(x, x2, A,B + y2 − x3, 1) is a solution modulo p we have for gcd(p, µ) = 1,
that (λ1/µ)
2 ≡ λ2/µ mod p. Put m = (λ
2
1 − λ2µ)/ gcd(λ
2
1, µ) so p | m. If
m 6= 0, write the solutions of (9) in the same form as (10).
In both cases, if m 6= 0 write
x˜G = λ1,
(˜
y2G
)
= λ31 +
λ4 + λ1λ3
2
, A˜ = λ3, B˜ =
λ4 − λ1λ3
2
over Zm.
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Clearly, if G˜ = (x˜G, y˜G) with a y˜G ∈ Zm[ζ]/(ζ2 −
(˜
y2G
)
), y˜G
2 =
(˜
y2G
)
, then
G˜ ∈ E
A˜,B˜
over Zm[ζ]/(ζ2 −
(˜
y2G
)
). Moreover, the vector
e = (x˜G, x˜G
2, A˜, B˜,
(˜
y2G
)
, x˜G
3)T ∈ Z6m
is a solution of (9). If y˜1 ∈ Zm[ξ]/(ξ2 − x31 − A˜x1 − B˜) is an element such
that W˜1 = (x1, y˜1) is on the curve EA˜,B˜, then writing W˜0 = W˜1⊕ (−G˜), the
sequence (x˜n) generated by the elliptic curve congruence generator (with
W˜0, G˜) satisfies (3) so x˜1, x˜2, . . . are in Zm and thus x˜i = xi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 7)
as integers.
Finally, if m = 0, write
x˜G =
λ1
µ
,
(˜
y2G
)
=
(
λ1
µ
)3
+
λ4
2µ
+
λ1λ3
2µ2
, A˜ =
λ3
µ
, B˜ =
λ4
2µ
−
λ1λ3
2µ2
over Q. Then G˜ = (x˜G, y˜G) ∈ EA˜,B˜ over Q
(√
(˜y2)
)
and the integer se-
quence x1 . . . , x7 is generated by G˜. The set of possible primes p are those
ones which p ∤ µ and p > max{xi : i = 1, . . . , 7}. 
Finally, it is remain to prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, it is enough to show that the vectors
v1 =


x22 + x2(x1 + x3)
x23 + x3(x2 + x4)
x24 + x4(x3 + x5)
x25 + x5(x4 + x6)
x26 + x6(x5 + x7)


,v2 =


x1 + x3
x2 + x4
x3 + x5
x4 + x6
x5 + x7


,v3 =


x2
x3
x4
x5
x6


,v4 =


1
1
1
1
1


are linearly independent over Fp.
Suppose to the contrary that there are α1, . . . , α4 ∈ Fp, (α1, . . . , α4) 6=
(0, . . . , 0) such that
α1v1 + α2v2 + α3v3 + α4v4 = 0
i.e.,
(12) α1(x
2
i+xi(xi−1+xi+1))+α2(xi−1+xi+1)+α3xi+α4 = 0, i = 2, . . . , 6.
Substituting (4) to (12) we have
α1
(
x2i + 2xi
(
x3i +Axi +B + y
2
G
(xi − xG)2
− (xi + xG)
))
+2α2
(
x3i +Axi +B + y
2
G
(xi − xG)2
− (xi + xG)
)
+α3xi+α4 = 0, i = 2, . . . , 6.
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Clearing the denominator we get
α1
(
x2i (xi − xG)
2 + 2xi
(
x3i +Axi +B + y
2
G − (xi + xG)(xi − xG)
2
))
+ 2α2
(
x3i +Axi +B + y
2
G − (xi + xG)(xi − xG)
2
)
+ α3xi(xi − xG)
2 + α4(xi − xG)
2 = 0
for i = 2, . . . , 6, which means that the polynomial F (X) ∈ Fp[X]
F (X) =
α1
(
X2(X − xG)
2 + 2X
(
X3 +AX +B + y2G − (X + xG)(X − xG)
2
))
+2α2
(
X3 +AX +B + y2G(X + xG)(X − xG)
2
)
+ α3X(X − xG)
2
+α4(X − xG)
2
has at least five zeros: xi, i = 2, . . . 6.
Write F (X) into the following form
(13) F (X) = α1
(
X4 + f4(X)
)
+ α3
(
X3 + f3(X)
)
+ (2α2x+ α4)X
2
+ (α2(2x
2 + 2A)− 2α4x)X + α2(−2x
3 + 2B + 2y2) + α4x
2,
where f3, f4 ∈ Fp[X] with deg f3 < 3 and deg f4 < 4.
Since degF ≤ 4, we must have that F (X) is the zero polynomial. In this
case we have
(14) α1 = 0, α3 = 0, 2α2x+ α4 = 0.
Then the coefficients of X and 1 in (13) are
α2(3x
2
G +A) = 0, α2(2x
3
G −B − y
2
G) = 0.
By (14) and (α1, . . . , α4) 6= (0, . . . , 0) we also have α2, α4 6= 0, thus
3x2G +A = 0, 2x
3
G −B − y
2
G = 0,
whence using (1) we get
2y2G = x(3x
2
G +A)− (x
3
G +AxG +B − y
2
G)− (2x
3
G −B − y
2
G) = 0,
thus
yG = 0, 3x
2
G +A = 0.
Since G = (xG, yG) ∈ E(Fp), we get that xG is a multiple root of the right
hand side of (1), which contradict that the discriminant of the curve is
non-zero. 
4. Numerical tests
I have implemented the algorithm of Theorem 1 in SAGE. The algorithm
have been tested for 1000 random examples of generators with 500-bit primes
p. For seven revealed sequence elements, the algorithm computed the exact
values of the parameters (p, A, B, G, W0) in 95,2% of the cases. In the
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remainder cases, the algorithm provided a composite integer m and param-
eters A˜, B˜, G˜, W˜0 such that p | m and A˜ ≡ A, B˜ ≡ B, G˜ ≡ G, W˜0 ≡ W0
mod p.
If the number of revealed sequence elements increases, then the algorithm
can be modified to become more effective. Namely, if there are eight revealed
sequence elements, then applying the algorithm for the first and the last
seven elements, two approximation (m1, A1, B1, G1) and (m2, A2, B2, G2)
are provided. Putting m = gcd(m1,m2, A1 − A2, B1 − B2, x(G1) − x(G2)),
m is a better approximation of p. Modifying the SAGE program in this way,
the algorithm was successful in 100% of the cases.
5. Final remarks, open questions
In this paper we showed that the sequence xn = x(nG⊕W0) (n = 1, 2, . . . )
is highly predictable if at least seven consecutive elements are revealed. A
natural question is whether one can reduce the number of revealed elements.
In the literature, the distribution and the linear complexity profile of the
general sequence f(nG⊕W0) with f ∈ Fp(E) have been also studied (where
Fp(E) is the function field of E(Fp)), see [1–4,8,9,11–14]. The predictability
of these sequences could be handle for individual functions f , but it is not
clear whether there is a universal algorithm for all function f (or at least all
function f with small degree).
An other possible question connected to the result is how much infor-
mation about x(nG ⊕ W0) we really need to recover all the private pa-
rameters. Gutierrez and Ibeas [7] showed that when the prime p and G
are known, then the sequence (Wn) is predictable even if just an approx-
imation of Wn, Wn+1 are revealed. However, the problem is still open in
the case when the prime is unknown. One can also consider this prob-
lem over arbitrary (not prime) finite fields. Namely, if the curve is defined
over a finite field Fps with degree s > 1, then one can define an integer
sequence as (x1(nG⊕W0), . . . , xr(nG⊕W0)) n = 1, 2, . . . where r ≤ s and
x1(P ), . . . , xs(P ) are the coordinates of x(P ) with respect to a fixed basis
of Fps over Fp. Is it possible to recover the whole sequence from an initial
segment, at least when the degree s is fixed? Clearly, the most interesting
case when p = 2 and the generator builds a binary sequence.
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